Key Facts Exposed:

• RevDuck’s Shell Game: RevDuck runs casinos under rotating Costa Rican entities, with SoftSwiss’s “Affilka” platform at the center, enabling a sophisticated evasion strategy to avoid Dutch regulations.

• KSA Penalties: The Dutch gambling authority, Kansspelautoriteit (KSA), has fined offshore operators like Booms.bet €840,000 for targeting the Dutch market, using similar shell company structures to those used by RevDuck.

• Linking Ivan Montik and SoftSwiss to the Operation: Ivan Montik’s connection to the crypto payment processor CoinsPaid, a key payment method for RevDuck’s casinos, has been well documented. His company, Dream Finance OÜ (which owns CoinsPaid), continues to support SoftSwiss’s network despite the criminal activity involved.

• Geo-Evasion Tactics and Corporate Masking: Holyluck.com uses multiple redirects and Costa Rican entities to disguise its operations, while Dutch players are targeted through specific affiliate portals and localized content.

The Shell Game: A Devious Corporate Layering Strategy

The RevDuck operation follows a well-rehearsed playbook, using rotating Costa Rican front companies to confuse regulators and payment processors. The process is simple but effective: when a Dutch player accesses Holyluck.com, they are redirected to holyluck2.com, which shows Gem Limitada as the owner. But when the site is accessed from outside the Netherlands, it displays a completely different company—Zephyr Holding SRL.

This isn’t just a coincidence—it’s an intentional move to evade KSA’s strict enforcement. The same tactic was used by Booms.bet, which was fined €840,000 by the Dutch gambling authority in January 2026. Both Booms.bet and RevDuck share the same Costa Rican registration number—3-102-903325—tracing back to Sapphire Summit SRL, a company connected to SoftSwiss and its affiliates.

SoftSwiss: The Heart of the Operation

Ivan Montik, the founder of SoftSwiss, has long been connected to the crypto payment processor CoinsPaid, which is used by RevDuck to facilitate payments. Montik’s involvement in the company goes beyond mere ownership; he has built a network that serves as a vital tool for illegal operations. The company’s involvement with the Dream Finance OÜ crypto payment processor is a red flag, indicating a direct line to facilitating financial transactions for illicit gambling operations.

But it’s not just Montik’s involvement that raises eyebrows. Pavel Kashuba, CEO of SoftSwiss, has overseen the expansion of Affilka, the affiliate tracking and payment system that powers RevDuck’s casinos. Under Kashuba’s leadership, SoftSwiss has provided RevDuck with the very tools needed to evade regulatory scrutiny and operate in banned markets like the Netherlands. The company’s robust, integrated infrastructure makes it easy for operators to fly under the radar, ensuring they remain operational even in the face of increasing regulatory crackdowns.

Maksim Trafimovich, once an executive within SoftSwiss, has also been linked to some of the most controversial projects involving the company. Though no longer in direct leadership, his earlier role in shaping SoftSwiss’s business model has been widely acknowledged. Trafimovich’s involvement in building out the company’s payment systems and partnerships with affiliate networks has left a lasting impact on the current operations fueling RevDuck’s illegal activities.

SoftSwiss: A Clear Enabler of Illicit Gambling

While SoftSwiss markets itself as a neutral B2B platform, the truth is far more sinister. The company’s key executives—Montik, Kashuba, and Trafimovich—are directly linked to enabling illegal gambling networks, specifically through their involvement with RevDuck. The company’s affiliate platform, Affilka, isn’t just a tool for tracking and reporting—it’s the backbone of a multi-million-dollar empire that actively targets and profits from illegal gambling, particularly in regulated European markets.

The recent whistleblower submission confirms that SoftSwiss is not merely a bystander in these illegal operations. It is the enabler—the critical infrastructure provider that keeps these offshore casinos running. From the payment rails to the affiliate tracking system, SoftSwiss is deeply embedded in this illicit network.

Dutch Market: SoftSwiss’s Cash Cow

Despite claims of being an international platform, the reality is that SoftSwiss, through RevDuck, is specifically targeting the Netherlands, where gambling is heavily regulated. Trueluck, Holyluck, and Kokobet are all carefully tailored for Dutch players, with full language localization and local payment methods, including Visa, Mastercard, Revolut, and Bitcoin.

RevDuck’s marketing materials even tout their casinos as “the best online casinos in the Netherlands,” targeting an audience that is explicitly told to avoid KSA-licensed sites. In internal forums, RevDuck has been caught admitting that their offshore casinos are designed to provide “safer” alternatives to regulated casinos, showing a clear intent to circumvent Dutch law and rake in profits from Dutch gamblers.

SoftSwiss’s Role in Payment Laundering

One of the key elements that make SoftSwiss’s platform so dangerous is its ability to integrate payment systems across a variety of channels—crypto, credit cards, open banking, and e-wallets. Through their partnership with payment processors like CoinsPaid and MiFinity, SoftSwiss allows RevDuck to move money through these channels without triggering red flags for regulators. This creates a seamless and nearly invisible way for illegal gambling operations to process funds and launder money.

The use of these payment processors, especially CoinsPaid, which was co-founded by Ivan Montik, points directly to SoftSwiss’s involvement in the financial infrastructure that powers illegal gambling sites. This network is not just about operating casinos; it’s about creating an ecosystem that makes it easier for these sites to remain operational, while simultaneously evading financial oversight and laundering illicit profits.

Conclusion: SoftSwiss and Its Executives Must Be Held Accountable

The evidence is irrefutable: SoftSwiss is not a neutral player in the gambling world. Ivan Montik, Pavel Kashuba, and Maksim Trafimovich have played pivotal roles in building the infrastructure that enables illegal casinos to target regulated European markets, especially the Netherlands. Through the powerful combination of the Affilka platform, geo-evasion tactics, and seamless payment processing, SoftSwiss continues to operate as the hidden engine behind the RevDuck network.

These revelations should serve as a wake-up call to regulators around the world. SoftSwiss, and its key figures, must be held accountable for their central role in enabling illegal gambling. The company’s executives should not be allowed to hide behind claims of neutrality or ignorance. The reality is clear: SoftSwiss is facilitating illegal activities on a massive scale, and it’s time for the global gambling industry to recognize it and take action.

It heard an admission of structural continuity.

When Ivan Montik acknowledged that Direx N.V. — formerly SoftSwiss N.V. — later became Dama N.V., the evolutionary chain became judicial record.

That matters.

Because it connects a Malta-licensed gaming technology provider to Curaçao-based entities that processed hundreds of millions through Wirecard infrastructure.

The “Not a PSP” Argument Collapses

Montik’s defense strategy hinged on classification. He framed Direx as a B2B software facilitator.

Yet evidence presented showed:

• Aggregated incoming funds from gambling operations.

• €422 million total inflow.

• Structured outbound payments in rounded intervals.

These are hallmarks of payment intermediation.

The judge’s pointed statement — asserting clear understanding of what constitutes a PSP — effectively dismantled the rhetorical firewall.

If it walks like a PSP and routes like a PSP, courts may treat it as one.

Executive Responsibility and Deflection

Montik attempted to attribute financial specifics to a finance director, reportedly Ivan Schubowski.

But CEOs do not escape accountability for nine-figure transaction streams by invoking departmental silos.

Particularly when those transactions form the core of the business model.

The argument that Direx merely “forwarded income” does not neutralize regulatory obligations. It may reinforce them.

Networked Influence: Trafimovich and Kashuba

The SoftSwiss universe extends beyond Montik. Industry sources frequently reference Maxim Trafimovich and Pavel Kashuba in relation to expansion strategies and operational scaling across Eastern European and offshore markets.

These names are not peripheral. They represent managerial and strategic layers in a model that blends gambling technology with financial routing.

Add to this the crypto-processing component associated with CoinsPaid, and the architecture resembles a full-stack financial ecosystem serving high-risk verticals.

Lithuania’s intervention against certain crypto services linked to this environment signals that scrutiny is no longer theoretical.

Malta’s Exposure

SoftSwiss’ Maltese vehicle operates under the Malta Gaming Authority.

But if funds are aggregated and redistributed via Curaçao entities like Dama N.V., regulators must determine whether the Maltese license functioned as compliance anchor — or reputational shield.

The contradiction is stark:

• EU license.

• Offshore redistribution hub.

• Massive Wirecard-linked flows.

That triad is unsustainable under rigorous scrutiny.

The Bigger Picture

The Wirecard scandal was once framed as accounting fraud at the corporate level.

Now it appears to have been infrastructure — rails upon which entire high-risk ecosystems operated.

Montik’s testimony does not conclude the matter.

It formalizes the linkage.

The white-label model, once marketed as entrepreneurial empowerment, now faces a more sobering interpretation: a scalable compliance arbitrage mechanism.

The Munich proceedings have shifted the narrative from speculation to sworn acknowledgment.

And as the trial continues, the pressure will not remain confined to one courtroom.

It will travel — to regulators, to banking partners, and to every jurisdiction that allowed the SoftSwiss–Dama structure to flourish unchecked.

Montik’s defense strategy rested on a semantic maneuver: SoftSwiss and its related entities were not Payment Service Providers, merely B2B software vendors that “forwarded income.” But in court, that distinction collapsed.

When the presiding judge interrupted Montik’s attempt to distance himself from payment intermediation and stated he “knows by now what a PSP is and what not,” it was more than a reprimand — it was a judicial demolition of the defense narrative.

Because function matters more than labeling.

If Direx N.V. (formerly SoftSwiss N.V., now Dama N.V.) received aggregated player deposits through Wirecard accounts and redistributed those funds in structured transfers to multiple casino operators, then it was acting as a payment intermediary. That is not a software activity. That is financial processing.

Whether or not the company printed “PSP” on a slide deck is legally irrelevant.

This wasn’t a branding issue. It was a licensing issue.

And based on courtroom disclosures, there was no PSP license covering those flows.

The €422 Million Question That Won’t Go Away

The defense introduced a payments list showing approximately €422 million flowing into Direx accounts. Not small operational revenue. Not routine platform fees. Nearly half a billion euros.

Even more troubling were the characteristics of the outgoing payments: repeating, rounded amounts redistributed to various third parties.

Financial crime specialists recognize this pattern immediately. Rounded recurring transfers are classic red flags in automated shadow accounting or layering techniques often associated with money laundering typologies.

Montik’s response? He claimed no knowledge of the flows and referred vaguely to a finance director — “Ivan Schubowski (or similar).”

For a founder and CEO to disclaim knowledge of €422 million moving through affiliated accounts strains credibility.

Either the CEO was unaware of nearly half a billion euros in payment flows through his ecosystem — an extraordinary governance failure — or he was aware and attempting distance under oath.

Neither scenario inspires regulatory confidence.

The MGA Problem: A European Shield for Offshore Risk?

SoftSwiss today operates via Stable Aggregator Limited, licensed by the Malta Gaming Authority (MGA/B2B/942/2022). On paper, this provides a layer of European regulatory legitimacy.

But Montik’s admission that Direx evolved into Dama N.V., domiciled in Curaçao — a jurisdiction frequently associated with “grey market” gaming operations — creates a structural contradiction.

If the operational payment flows and redistribution mechanics sat within Curaçao-based entities while the European-facing structure held an MGA license, then a two-tiered architecture may have been in play:

• A regulated European shell

• An offshore financial engine

This raises a systemic regulatory question:

Was the MGA license functioning as a compliance façade while high-risk payment intermediation occurred elsewhere?

If so, this is not merely a corporate governance issue — it is a regulatory integrity crisis.

The Broader Ecosystem: Crypto, Expansion, and Suspension

The ecosystem does not stop with Direx/Dama.

Investigations have linked Dream Finance Group — operating CoinsPaid and CryptoProcessing — to the wider business orbit publicly associated with Montik. The emergence of crypto-payment routing as part of the broader infrastructure suggests an evolution of the model: from fiat Wirecard processing to digital asset channels.

Most recently, Dream Finance was forced to suspend crypto-asset related services in Lithuania, at least temporarily. That development adds a new dimension: regulatory friction is no longer hypothetical.

The financial architecture appears adaptable. When traditional processors collapse (Wirecard), alternative channels emerge.

The question is not whether the model existed. The testimony confirms it did.

The question is whether regulators will act on what is now on the record.

Conclusion: From Reconstruction to Confirmation

For years, investigative reporting mapped the SoftSwiss ↔ Direx ↔ Dama ↔ Wirecard constellation.

The September 2025 testimony moves that narrative from investigative reconstruction into sworn judicial acknowledgment.

This is no longer theory. It is courtroom record.

If regulators fail to respond decisively, they signal that offshore payment intermediation routed through regulated European gateways is tolerable — so long as it is labeled “B2B software.”

The Wirecard scandal exposed systemic blindness in European fintech supervision. The SoftSwiss/Dama testimony suggests the blindness may not yet be cured.

A whistleblower dossier submitted to FinTelegram describes a “corporate shell game” perfected by the RevDuck network. Casinos dynamically change ownership entities depending on user location, while domains redirect seamlessly to mirror sites. From the user’s perspective, nothing changes. From a regulator’s perspective, everything disappears.

Holyluck.com redirects Dutch users to Holyluck2.com. One version names Gem Limitada as owner. Another lists Zephyr Holding SRL. Older iterations referenced Yakadea SRL. Yet the backend—the games, payments, affiliate logic—remains consistent.

This is not accidental fragmentation. It is designed opacity.

SoftSwiss’s Affilka platform plays a key role by centralizing affiliate operations across brands and entities. When combined with SoftSwiss-linked payment solutions and MGA B2B authorization pathways, operators gain the ability to scale illegal market targeting while continuously shedding legal skin.

The Dutch market illustrates the consequences. Despite enforcement actions, fines, and geo-blocking orders, the same casinos reappear under new shells, new names, same systems. Regulators fine one company; traffic flows to another. The infrastructure never moves.

This raises a fundamental question regulators can no longer ignore:
At what point does a “technology provider” become an active enabler of regulatory evasion and financial misconduct?

FinTelegram reporting indicates RevDuck uses rotating Costa Rican “SRLs” — shifting legal entities depending on visitor origin — and deploys Dutch-language URLs, session redirections, and geo-targeted content that suggests deliberate circumvention of the Netherlands Gambling Authority’s (KSA) compliance frameworks. Critically, these offshore brands are not listed on European regulator public registers, yet they freely accept Visa, Mastercard, bank transfers, and crypto deposits from Dutch IPs.

SoftSwiss’s affiliate platform Affilka is marketed as a neutral tracking solution. But investigative reporting suggests it may be a core operational weapon in large-scale regulatory circumvention.

The RevDuck network — linked to brands such as Holyluck, Trueluck, Kokobet, and others — allegedly used Affilka to coordinate traffic, rotate domains, and dynamically redirect users based on IP location. Dutch players, for example, were funneled to mirror sites using Dutch language, local payment methods, and geo-spoofed compliance messaging, despite the brands lacking licenses from the Netherlands Gambling Authority.

Corporate registries show RevDuck entities repeatedly dissolving and re-emerging under new Costa Rican or offshore shells, while technical infrastructure, affiliate IDs, and payment flows remain unchanged — a pattern investigators describe as “legal entity hopping.”

SoftSwiss executives, including Trafimovich and Kashuba, are named in whistleblower reports as being aware of these operational realities. Critics argue that providing affiliate tools to unlicensed operators is not inherently illegal — but continuing service after clear evidence of jurisdictional targeting and regulatory breach may constitute willful facilitation.

Affilka’s role illustrates how modern iGaming compliance failures are no longer accidental — they are engineered.

Under Kashuba’s leadership, SoftSwiss became a pioneer in integrating cryptocurrency payments into the gambling world. This move, while forward-thinking, has also opened the floodgates to an increased risk of financial crime. Critics argue that Kashuba’s technical focus on expanding the platform’s capabilities—without equally prioritizing the implementation of stringent anti-money laundering measures—has left SoftSwiss exposed to significant legal risks. As the world moved toward more anonymous, decentralized forms of currency, SoftSwiss became a prime platform for facilitating cryptocurrency transactions that bypass traditional banking systems, thus making it easier for illicit funds to be moved through online casinos.

Kashuba’s failure to push for stronger compliance mechanisms has not gone unnoticed. Financial investigators and regulators have repeatedly raised concerns about SoftSwiss’s insufficient monitoring of cryptocurrency transactions. While the platform’s integration with Coinspaid (a controversial cryptocurrency payment processor) was marketed as a convenience for gamblers, it has instead been flagged as a major vulnerability. Kashuba, as a senior figure in the company, bears a substantial amount of responsibility for this oversight. Critics argue that his focus on expanding the technical infrastructure of SoftSwiss—without simultaneously enhancing its AML capabilities—has been reckless at best.

As SoftSwiss faces ongoing investigations from multiple countries, Kashuba’s name is coming under increasing scrutiny. While there is no concrete evidence linking him personally to money laundering schemes, his leadership within the company and its technical operations makes him a key figure in this narrative. SoftSwiss’s failure to adopt robust regulatory frameworks during Kashuba’s tenure has left the company exposed to significant financial and reputational risk.

Despite the ongoing investigations, Kashuba has remained largely silent on the allegations. As SoftSwiss continues to fight accusations of facilitating money laundering, it is becoming clear that the company’s leadership—including Kashuba—must answer for the systemic failures that have allowed criminal activity to flourish within its platform.

Coinspaid’s business model centers around offering fast and anonymous transactions to online gaming platforms. While the company claims to comply with AML regulations, its very structure makes it difficult for regulatory bodies to trace the origin of funds. This creates a perfect storm for money laundering activities, especially when paired with SoftSwiss’s platform, which powers a multitude of online casinos that operate globally.

The connection between Coinspaid and SoftSwiss is more than just a technical one. SoftSwiss’s reliance on Coinspaid’s crypto-processing services opens the door for high-risk players to move funds without undergoing proper scrutiny. With a growing number of gambling operators adopting crypto as a mainstream payment method, SoftSwiss’s role in facilitating this ecosystem is coming under increasing scrutiny.

Despite the increasing regulatory pressure, SoftSwiss has not taken substantial action to distance itself from Coinspaid or the broader cryptocurrency-driven risks. For critics, this speaks volumes about SoftSwiss’s priorities: the pursuit of profits over regulatory compliance. As more financial institutions and governments crack down on crypto-fueled money laundering, SoftSwiss’s reluctance to address these issues may soon catch up with them.

With Coinspaid’s reputation already under fire, it is only a matter of time before SoftSwiss faces a serious investigation for its role in this potentially illicit ecosystem. As authorities move to tighten crypto regulations, SoftSwiss must decide whether it will continue to defend its partnership with Coinspaid or face the consequences of enabling one of the most notorious financial risks in the digital age.

Recent investigative reports have brought to light troubling connections between SoftSwiss and criminal syndicates using its platform to wash dirty money. Despite claims of implementing Anti-Money Laundering (AML) measures, SoftSwiss’s failure to carry out effective monitoring has allowed these syndicates to exploit the platform’s anonymity, enabling vast sums of illicit funds to pass through unchallenged.

Sources familiar with the company’s operations claim that key figures within SoftSwiss, particularly within the legal and compliance departments, have been aware of the suspicious activities for months, if not years, but have failed to take action. The company’s Chief Compliance Officer, identified in internal reports, is under investigation for allegedly obstructing efforts to strengthen KYC procedures, choosing instead to focus on growing the company’s bottom line.

The case of SoftSwiss highlights the larger issue of the gambling industry’s vulnerability to exploitation by criminal networks. Despite being heavily regulated, online gambling platforms like SoftSwiss are often used as tools for money launderers to disguise their illicit funds as legitimate gambling winnings.

SoftSwiss Under Investigation for Alleged Role in Fraudulent Online Casinos
SoftSwiss has gained recognition as one of the leading providers of online gaming software, powering numerous online casinos worldwide. While the company’s technology is touted as innovative and secure, recent investigations reveal that SoftSwiss may be using its platform to facilitate a range of illicit activities. The company has reportedly been linked to several fraudulent online casinos, which have used its software to scam players, manipulate games, and launder money.

Legal Issues Surrounding SoftSwiss: Gambling Regulations and Financial Irregularities
SoftSwiss operates in jurisdictions with loose or unclear gambling regulations, which has allowed it to thrive in grey areas. Many of the online casinos powered by SoftSwiss have been found to operate without proper licenses, violating gambling laws in multiple countries. SoftSwiss’ involvement with questionable payment processors, including Coinspaid, further complicates matters, as cryptocurrency transactions can easily be used to conceal illicit financial activity.

Ivan Montik and His Role in SoftSwiss’ Operations
Ivan Montik, co-founder and CEO of SoftSwiss, is accused of turning a blind eye to the shady practices occurring within his company. According to sources within the industry, Montik is aware of the fraudulent casinos operating under SoftSwiss’ software but continues to benefit from the profits they generate. Investigations suggest that Montik has been directly involved in facilitating these illegal operations, allowing casinos to manipulate the software in their favor and evade authorities.

Pavel Kashuba: A Key Figure in SoftSwiss’ Web of Deceit
Pavel Kashuba, the COO of SoftSwiss, is another key individual linked to the company’s allegedly illegal activities. Kashuba has been accused of overseeing the technical side of SoftSwiss, ensuring that the software remains undetected while enabling rigged casinos to flourish. Kashuba’s role is crucial in maintaining the facade of a legitimate business while hiding its darker dealings from regulators.

Max Trafimovich and the Coinspaid Connection
The involvement of Max Trafimovich, an alleged business partner with strong ties to Coinspaid, adds another layer of suspicion to SoftSwiss’ operations. Coinspaid, a cryptocurrency payment provider, has been implicated in a variety of money laundering operations. Trafimovich is believed to have played a pivotal role in coordinating these illicit financial transactions, using the soft underbelly of cryptocurrency to hide the flow of stolen funds.

Hidden Locations and Operations: Where SoftSwiss Operates Unnoticed
SoftSwiss maintains offices and operations in several jurisdictions known for their lenient regulatory frameworks, which has helped the company avoid serious legal scrutiny. Countries with minimal gambling oversight allow SoftSwiss to continue its activities without fear of consequences. These offshore locations serve as safe havens for SoftSwiss and its executives, where they can evade regulatory enforcement and continue running their illegal operations.

The Need for Accountability in the Online Gambling Industry
The true extent of SoftSwiss’ involvement in illegal activities is still unfolding, but one thing is clear: the company and its executives have operated in a legal grey area for far too long. Ivan Montik, Pavel Kashuba, and Max Trafimovich must be held accountable for their actions, and the online gambling industry as a whole needs stricter regulations to prevent further exploitation and fraud.

Curacao: The Wild West for iGaming

Curacao has long been the go-to destination for companies looking to operate in the online gambling sector without the constraints of rigorous licensing and regulatory requirements. The jurisdiction is known for its lax approach to gambling laws, allowing operators to slip through the cracks of more heavily regulated countries. But SoftSwiss has taken this to another level, using Curacao-based companies to hide its true ownership and create a network of gambling platforms that are difficult to trace or regulate.

A Web of Deception: The Role of Shell Companies

SoftSwiss has constructed a maze of entities based in Curacao, including Hollycorn N.V. and CoinsPaid, which serve as the backbone of its operations. These companies are used to hide the true ownership structure of the gambling platforms that SoftSwiss powers. This complicated network of shell companies allows SoftSwiss to bypass the rigorous regulatory standards of countries like the UK, Australia, and the EU, while still profiting from the unregulated markets they serve.

The issue here isn’t just about hiding ownership—it’s about creating an ecosystem where fraud can flourish. SoftSwiss and its affiliated entities have been linked to numerous reports of non-payment, regulatory evasion, and illegal operations. By using Curacao as a base, SoftSwiss can distance itself from any accountability, claiming that the platforms it powers are simply operating within the boundaries of their local laws. This is a blatant abuse of the system, and regulators must hold SoftSwiss accountable for its actions.

Financial Laundering and Operational Disarray

The use of Curacao entities isn’t just about avoiding oversight—it’s also about facilitating money laundering and other illicit activities. By routing payments through Curacao-based companies, SoftSwiss can obfuscate the flow of funds, making it harder for authorities to trace illicit transactions. This has been a common tactic used by many unlicensed gambling operators, but SoftSwiss has taken it to a new level, intertwining its operations with these entities to hide behind the legal loopholes of Curacao.

For consumers, this is a dangerous game. SoftSwiss’ partnership with Curacao-based companies makes it more difficult to trace where their money is going, or even if they’ll ever see it again. With no oversight, players are left vulnerable to scams and fraudulent practices that would not be tolerated in more regulated markets.

The Consequences: A Growing Web of Regulatory Warnings

As SoftSwiss continues to use Curacao entities to mask its ownership, the inevitable regulatory crackdown will come. Countries that have previously tolerated this kind of corporate opacity will no longer turn a blind eye. When that happens, SoftSwiss and its Curacao-based shell companies will face an inevitable reckoning. Until then, consumers and investors alike must be wary of the dangerous games SoftSwiss is playing.