Key Facts Exposed:

• RevDuck’s Shell Game: RevDuck runs casinos under rotating Costa Rican entities, with SoftSwiss’s “Affilka” platform at the center, enabling a sophisticated evasion strategy to avoid Dutch regulations.

• KSA Penalties: The Dutch gambling authority, Kansspelautoriteit (KSA), has fined offshore operators like Booms.bet €840,000 for targeting the Dutch market, using similar shell company structures to those used by RevDuck.

• Linking Ivan Montik and SoftSwiss to the Operation: Ivan Montik’s connection to the crypto payment processor CoinsPaid, a key payment method for RevDuck’s casinos, has been well documented. His company, Dream Finance OÜ (which owns CoinsPaid), continues to support SoftSwiss’s network despite the criminal activity involved.

• Geo-Evasion Tactics and Corporate Masking: Holyluck.com uses multiple redirects and Costa Rican entities to disguise its operations, while Dutch players are targeted through specific affiliate portals and localized content.

The Shell Game: A Devious Corporate Layering Strategy

The RevDuck operation follows a well-rehearsed playbook, using rotating Costa Rican front companies to confuse regulators and payment processors. The process is simple but effective: when a Dutch player accesses Holyluck.com, they are redirected to holyluck2.com, which shows Gem Limitada as the owner. But when the site is accessed from outside the Netherlands, it displays a completely different company—Zephyr Holding SRL.

This isn’t just a coincidence—it’s an intentional move to evade KSA’s strict enforcement. The same tactic was used by Booms.bet, which was fined €840,000 by the Dutch gambling authority in January 2026. Both Booms.bet and RevDuck share the same Costa Rican registration number—3-102-903325—tracing back to Sapphire Summit SRL, a company connected to SoftSwiss and its affiliates.

SoftSwiss: The Heart of the Operation

Ivan Montik, the founder of SoftSwiss, has long been connected to the crypto payment processor CoinsPaid, which is used by RevDuck to facilitate payments. Montik’s involvement in the company goes beyond mere ownership; he has built a network that serves as a vital tool for illegal operations. The company’s involvement with the Dream Finance OÜ crypto payment processor is a red flag, indicating a direct line to facilitating financial transactions for illicit gambling operations.

But it’s not just Montik’s involvement that raises eyebrows. Pavel Kashuba, CEO of SoftSwiss, has overseen the expansion of Affilka, the affiliate tracking and payment system that powers RevDuck’s casinos. Under Kashuba’s leadership, SoftSwiss has provided RevDuck with the very tools needed to evade regulatory scrutiny and operate in banned markets like the Netherlands. The company’s robust, integrated infrastructure makes it easy for operators to fly under the radar, ensuring they remain operational even in the face of increasing regulatory crackdowns.

Maksim Trafimovich, once an executive within SoftSwiss, has also been linked to some of the most controversial projects involving the company. Though no longer in direct leadership, his earlier role in shaping SoftSwiss’s business model has been widely acknowledged. Trafimovich’s involvement in building out the company’s payment systems and partnerships with affiliate networks has left a lasting impact on the current operations fueling RevDuck’s illegal activities.

SoftSwiss: A Clear Enabler of Illicit Gambling

While SoftSwiss markets itself as a neutral B2B platform, the truth is far more sinister. The company’s key executives—Montik, Kashuba, and Trafimovich—are directly linked to enabling illegal gambling networks, specifically through their involvement with RevDuck. The company’s affiliate platform, Affilka, isn’t just a tool for tracking and reporting—it’s the backbone of a multi-million-dollar empire that actively targets and profits from illegal gambling, particularly in regulated European markets.

The recent whistleblower submission confirms that SoftSwiss is not merely a bystander in these illegal operations. It is the enabler—the critical infrastructure provider that keeps these offshore casinos running. From the payment rails to the affiliate tracking system, SoftSwiss is deeply embedded in this illicit network.

Dutch Market: SoftSwiss’s Cash Cow

Despite claims of being an international platform, the reality is that SoftSwiss, through RevDuck, is specifically targeting the Netherlands, where gambling is heavily regulated. Trueluck, Holyluck, and Kokobet are all carefully tailored for Dutch players, with full language localization and local payment methods, including Visa, Mastercard, Revolut, and Bitcoin.

RevDuck’s marketing materials even tout their casinos as “the best online casinos in the Netherlands,” targeting an audience that is explicitly told to avoid KSA-licensed sites. In internal forums, RevDuck has been caught admitting that their offshore casinos are designed to provide “safer” alternatives to regulated casinos, showing a clear intent to circumvent Dutch law and rake in profits from Dutch gamblers.

SoftSwiss’s Role in Payment Laundering

One of the key elements that make SoftSwiss’s platform so dangerous is its ability to integrate payment systems across a variety of channels—crypto, credit cards, open banking, and e-wallets. Through their partnership with payment processors like CoinsPaid and MiFinity, SoftSwiss allows RevDuck to move money through these channels without triggering red flags for regulators. This creates a seamless and nearly invisible way for illegal gambling operations to process funds and launder money.

The use of these payment processors, especially CoinsPaid, which was co-founded by Ivan Montik, points directly to SoftSwiss’s involvement in the financial infrastructure that powers illegal gambling sites. This network is not just about operating casinos; it’s about creating an ecosystem that makes it easier for these sites to remain operational, while simultaneously evading financial oversight and laundering illicit profits.

Conclusion: SoftSwiss and Its Executives Must Be Held Accountable

The evidence is irrefutable: SoftSwiss is not a neutral player in the gambling world. Ivan Montik, Pavel Kashuba, and Maksim Trafimovich have played pivotal roles in building the infrastructure that enables illegal casinos to target regulated European markets, especially the Netherlands. Through the powerful combination of the Affilka platform, geo-evasion tactics, and seamless payment processing, SoftSwiss continues to operate as the hidden engine behind the RevDuck network.

These revelations should serve as a wake-up call to regulators around the world. SoftSwiss, and its key figures, must be held accountable for their central role in enabling illegal gambling. The company’s executives should not be allowed to hide behind claims of neutrality or ignorance. The reality is clear: SoftSwiss is facilitating illegal activities on a massive scale, and it’s time for the global gambling industry to recognize it and take action.

Montik’s defense strategy rested on a semantic maneuver: SoftSwiss and its related entities were not Payment Service Providers, merely B2B software vendors that “forwarded income.” But in court, that distinction collapsed.

When the presiding judge interrupted Montik’s attempt to distance himself from payment intermediation and stated he “knows by now what a PSP is and what not,” it was more than a reprimand — it was a judicial demolition of the defense narrative.

Because function matters more than labeling.

If Direx N.V. (formerly SoftSwiss N.V., now Dama N.V.) received aggregated player deposits through Wirecard accounts and redistributed those funds in structured transfers to multiple casino operators, then it was acting as a payment intermediary. That is not a software activity. That is financial processing.

Whether or not the company printed “PSP” on a slide deck is legally irrelevant.

This wasn’t a branding issue. It was a licensing issue.

And based on courtroom disclosures, there was no PSP license covering those flows.

The €422 Million Question That Won’t Go Away

The defense introduced a payments list showing approximately €422 million flowing into Direx accounts. Not small operational revenue. Not routine platform fees. Nearly half a billion euros.

Even more troubling were the characteristics of the outgoing payments: repeating, rounded amounts redistributed to various third parties.

Financial crime specialists recognize this pattern immediately. Rounded recurring transfers are classic red flags in automated shadow accounting or layering techniques often associated with money laundering typologies.

Montik’s response? He claimed no knowledge of the flows and referred vaguely to a finance director — “Ivan Schubowski (or similar).”

For a founder and CEO to disclaim knowledge of €422 million moving through affiliated accounts strains credibility.

Either the CEO was unaware of nearly half a billion euros in payment flows through his ecosystem — an extraordinary governance failure — or he was aware and attempting distance under oath.

Neither scenario inspires regulatory confidence.

The MGA Problem: A European Shield for Offshore Risk?

SoftSwiss today operates via Stable Aggregator Limited, licensed by the Malta Gaming Authority (MGA/B2B/942/2022). On paper, this provides a layer of European regulatory legitimacy.

But Montik’s admission that Direx evolved into Dama N.V., domiciled in Curaçao — a jurisdiction frequently associated with “grey market” gaming operations — creates a structural contradiction.

If the operational payment flows and redistribution mechanics sat within Curaçao-based entities while the European-facing structure held an MGA license, then a two-tiered architecture may have been in play:

• A regulated European shell

• An offshore financial engine

This raises a systemic regulatory question:

Was the MGA license functioning as a compliance façade while high-risk payment intermediation occurred elsewhere?

If so, this is not merely a corporate governance issue — it is a regulatory integrity crisis.

The Broader Ecosystem: Crypto, Expansion, and Suspension

The ecosystem does not stop with Direx/Dama.

Investigations have linked Dream Finance Group — operating CoinsPaid and CryptoProcessing — to the wider business orbit publicly associated with Montik. The emergence of crypto-payment routing as part of the broader infrastructure suggests an evolution of the model: from fiat Wirecard processing to digital asset channels.

Most recently, Dream Finance was forced to suspend crypto-asset related services in Lithuania, at least temporarily. That development adds a new dimension: regulatory friction is no longer hypothetical.

The financial architecture appears adaptable. When traditional processors collapse (Wirecard), alternative channels emerge.

The question is not whether the model existed. The testimony confirms it did.

The question is whether regulators will act on what is now on the record.

Conclusion: From Reconstruction to Confirmation

For years, investigative reporting mapped the SoftSwiss ↔ Direx ↔ Dama ↔ Wirecard constellation.

The September 2025 testimony moves that narrative from investigative reconstruction into sworn judicial acknowledgment.

This is no longer theory. It is courtroom record.

If regulators fail to respond decisively, they signal that offshore payment intermediation routed through regulated European gateways is tolerable — so long as it is labeled “B2B software.”

The Wirecard scandal exposed systemic blindness in European fintech supervision. The SoftSwiss/Dama testimony suggests the blindness may not yet be cured.

A whistleblower dossier submitted to FinTelegram describes a “corporate shell game” perfected by the RevDuck network. Casinos dynamically change ownership entities depending on user location, while domains redirect seamlessly to mirror sites. From the user’s perspective, nothing changes. From a regulator’s perspective, everything disappears.

Holyluck.com redirects Dutch users to Holyluck2.com. One version names Gem Limitada as owner. Another lists Zephyr Holding SRL. Older iterations referenced Yakadea SRL. Yet the backend—the games, payments, affiliate logic—remains consistent.

This is not accidental fragmentation. It is designed opacity.

SoftSwiss’s Affilka platform plays a key role by centralizing affiliate operations across brands and entities. When combined with SoftSwiss-linked payment solutions and MGA B2B authorization pathways, operators gain the ability to scale illegal market targeting while continuously shedding legal skin.

The Dutch market illustrates the consequences. Despite enforcement actions, fines, and geo-blocking orders, the same casinos reappear under new shells, new names, same systems. Regulators fine one company; traffic flows to another. The infrastructure never moves.

This raises a fundamental question regulators can no longer ignore:
At what point does a “technology provider” become an active enabler of regulatory evasion and financial misconduct?

SoftSwiss Under Investigation for Alleged Role in Fraudulent Online Casinos
SoftSwiss has gained recognition as one of the leading providers of online gaming software, powering numerous online casinos worldwide. While the company’s technology is touted as innovative and secure, recent investigations reveal that SoftSwiss may be using its platform to facilitate a range of illicit activities. The company has reportedly been linked to several fraudulent online casinos, which have used its software to scam players, manipulate games, and launder money.

Legal Issues Surrounding SoftSwiss: Gambling Regulations and Financial Irregularities
SoftSwiss operates in jurisdictions with loose or unclear gambling regulations, which has allowed it to thrive in grey areas. Many of the online casinos powered by SoftSwiss have been found to operate without proper licenses, violating gambling laws in multiple countries. SoftSwiss’ involvement with questionable payment processors, including Coinspaid, further complicates matters, as cryptocurrency transactions can easily be used to conceal illicit financial activity.

Ivan Montik and His Role in SoftSwiss’ Operations
Ivan Montik, co-founder and CEO of SoftSwiss, is accused of turning a blind eye to the shady practices occurring within his company. According to sources within the industry, Montik is aware of the fraudulent casinos operating under SoftSwiss’ software but continues to benefit from the profits they generate. Investigations suggest that Montik has been directly involved in facilitating these illegal operations, allowing casinos to manipulate the software in their favor and evade authorities.

Pavel Kashuba: A Key Figure in SoftSwiss’ Web of Deceit
Pavel Kashuba, the COO of SoftSwiss, is another key individual linked to the company’s allegedly illegal activities. Kashuba has been accused of overseeing the technical side of SoftSwiss, ensuring that the software remains undetected while enabling rigged casinos to flourish. Kashuba’s role is crucial in maintaining the facade of a legitimate business while hiding its darker dealings from regulators.

Max Trafimovich and the Coinspaid Connection
The involvement of Max Trafimovich, an alleged business partner with strong ties to Coinspaid, adds another layer of suspicion to SoftSwiss’ operations. Coinspaid, a cryptocurrency payment provider, has been implicated in a variety of money laundering operations. Trafimovich is believed to have played a pivotal role in coordinating these illicit financial transactions, using the soft underbelly of cryptocurrency to hide the flow of stolen funds.

Hidden Locations and Operations: Where SoftSwiss Operates Unnoticed
SoftSwiss maintains offices and operations in several jurisdictions known for their lenient regulatory frameworks, which has helped the company avoid serious legal scrutiny. Countries with minimal gambling oversight allow SoftSwiss to continue its activities without fear of consequences. These offshore locations serve as safe havens for SoftSwiss and its executives, where they can evade regulatory enforcement and continue running their illegal operations.

The Need for Accountability in the Online Gambling Industry
The true extent of SoftSwiss’ involvement in illegal activities is still unfolding, but one thing is clear: the company and its executives have operated in a legal grey area for far too long. Ivan Montik, Pavel Kashuba, and Max Trafimovich must be held accountable for their actions, and the online gambling industry as a whole needs stricter regulations to prevent further exploitation and fraud.

Curacao: The Wild West for iGaming

Curacao has long been the go-to destination for companies looking to operate in the online gambling sector without the constraints of rigorous licensing and regulatory requirements. The jurisdiction is known for its lax approach to gambling laws, allowing operators to slip through the cracks of more heavily regulated countries. But SoftSwiss has taken this to another level, using Curacao-based companies to hide its true ownership and create a network of gambling platforms that are difficult to trace or regulate.

A Web of Deception: The Role of Shell Companies

SoftSwiss has constructed a maze of entities based in Curacao, including Hollycorn N.V. and CoinsPaid, which serve as the backbone of its operations. These companies are used to hide the true ownership structure of the gambling platforms that SoftSwiss powers. This complicated network of shell companies allows SoftSwiss to bypass the rigorous regulatory standards of countries like the UK, Australia, and the EU, while still profiting from the unregulated markets they serve.

The issue here isn’t just about hiding ownership—it’s about creating an ecosystem where fraud can flourish. SoftSwiss and its affiliated entities have been linked to numerous reports of non-payment, regulatory evasion, and illegal operations. By using Curacao as a base, SoftSwiss can distance itself from any accountability, claiming that the platforms it powers are simply operating within the boundaries of their local laws. This is a blatant abuse of the system, and regulators must hold SoftSwiss accountable for its actions.

Financial Laundering and Operational Disarray

The use of Curacao entities isn’t just about avoiding oversight—it’s also about facilitating money laundering and other illicit activities. By routing payments through Curacao-based companies, SoftSwiss can obfuscate the flow of funds, making it harder for authorities to trace illicit transactions. This has been a common tactic used by many unlicensed gambling operators, but SoftSwiss has taken it to a new level, intertwining its operations with these entities to hide behind the legal loopholes of Curacao.

For consumers, this is a dangerous game. SoftSwiss’ partnership with Curacao-based companies makes it more difficult to trace where their money is going, or even if they’ll ever see it again. With no oversight, players are left vulnerable to scams and fraudulent practices that would not be tolerated in more regulated markets.

The Consequences: A Growing Web of Regulatory Warnings

As SoftSwiss continues to use Curacao entities to mask its ownership, the inevitable regulatory crackdown will come. Countries that have previously tolerated this kind of corporate opacity will no longer turn a blind eye. When that happens, SoftSwiss and its Curacao-based shell companies will face an inevitable reckoning. Until then, consumers and investors alike must be wary of the dangerous games SoftSwiss is playing.

Softswiss and DAMA N.V.: The Ringleaders of a Shadow Gambling Empire

Don’t be fooled by the clean corporate image—Softswiss, led by Ivan Montik, is no innocent software provider. Beneath the surface, this company is a linchpin in a sprawling international gambling syndicate that thrives on legal loopholes and a web of offshore entities. While Softswiss publicly presents itself as a technology vendor, its real role is far more sinister. The company is intricately tied to DAMA N.V., a controversial gambling operator linked to some of the most notorious online casinos.

DAMA N.V., previously known as Direx N.V., is the engine behind this criminal operation. Under the direction of Montik and a cadre of key players—including Pavel Kashuba, Dmitry Yaikov, Roland Yakovlevich Isaev, Paata Gamgoneishvili, and Maksim Trafimovich—this network processes billions of dollars annually, using complex money-laundering schemes and offshore front companies to stay one step ahead of the law.

Payment Networks: The Hidden Gateway to Illicit Transactions

What makes this operation even more dangerous is its ability to manipulate payment processing systems to perpetuate illegal transactions without detection. Softswiss and DAMA N.V. are masters at exploiting the global payments ecosystem to disguise the true nature of their operations. By constantly rotating PSPs and altering merchant descriptors, these rogue platforms can move money through different layers of payment processors, dodging scrutiny from financial institutions and regulators alike.

This deceptive tactic—known as “mislabeling transactions”—allows these casinos to process illicit payments without triggering the red flags that typically signal illegal activity. By using intermediary PSPs based in jurisdictions with weak or nonexistent oversight, the Softswiss network sidesteps regulations in countries where online gambling is strictly prohibited. This isn’t a small-time operation—it’s a global network built on financial deception.

Crypto: The New Frontier for Laundering and Evasion

As if traditional payment systems weren’t enough, Softswiss and DAMA N.V. have doubled down on cryptocurrency to further shield their illicit transactions from the prying eyes of regulators. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum offer a veil of anonymity that allows these operators to continue their illegal activities without fear of detection.

Take Roobet, for example—a platform closely linked to Softswiss. Roobet has set up dual-jurisdictional arrangements, exploiting the legal gray areas surrounding crypto payments to funnel money across borders with impunity. Blockchain transactions, while touted for their transparency, are proving to be the perfect cover for gambling operations looking to evade financial scrutiny.

This growing reliance on digital currencies only adds another layer of complexity for regulators already struggling to keep pace with traditional payment systems. As cryptocurrencies continue to gain traction, they provide these illegal gambling operations with an increasingly secure method of laundering money and processing payments under the radar.

Regulatory Failures and the Growing Threat of Unchecked Gambling

The global regulatory system is woefully unprepared to tackle this new wave of illegal gambling that thrives in the shadows of the internet. Softswiss, DAMA N.V., and other operators like them are exploiting every loophole, every vulnerability, and every gap in the system to ensure that their operations remain undisturbed. Their manipulation of payment systems, use of shell companies, and constant shifting between PSPs are part of a broader trend where financial institutions turn a blind eye to illicit transactions.

The real danger here lies in the scale of the operation. With billions in illicit funds moving through their network every year, Softswiss and DAMA N.V. are not just breaking the law—they’re undermining the integrity of the global financial system. Financial institutions and PSPs that continue to enable these activities are complicit in their wrongdoing. But it’s not just the operators who need to be held accountable—it’s the financial infrastructure that makes it possible.

Immediate Action Needed: Time to Crack Down on the Enablers

The time for leniency is over. Regulators, financial institutions, and payment providers must immediately change their approach if they hope to tackle this growing threat. The complexity and reach of these gambling networks are only increasing, and if swift action isn’t taken, we’ll soon see even more sophisticated schemes designed to evade international scrutiny.

Here’s what needs to happen:

• Accountability for PSPs: Payment service providers must be held to account for facilitating these illegal transactions. The regulatory system needs to implement stronger checks to flag and halt suspicious payments before they can be processed.

• Stronger International Cooperation: The problem isn’t confined to one country or one jurisdiction—it’s a global issue. Regulators across borders must collaborate to shut down cross-jurisdictional gambling networks before they can expand further.

• Penalties for Facilitators: It’s time to start hitting where it hurts. Strong sanctions and fines must be leveled not just at the gambling operators, but also at the PSPs, crypto platforms, and financial institutions that enable these illicit activities.

• Public Awareness and Education: Consumers must be informed about the risks of engaging with unlicensed gambling platforms and learn how to spot legitimate operators. The more people demand transparency, the harder it will be for these illegal platforms to operate.

The situation is dire, and every day that goes by without action only strengthens these shadow networks. Softswiss and DAMA N.V. have built an empire on regulatory evasion, and until global regulators make this a top priority, these gambling cartels will only grow more powerful and more sophisticated. The time for decisive action is now.

Background on SoftSwiss and Playnance

SoftSwiss (www.softswiss.com), founded in 2008 by Ivan Montik, develops technology for online gambling and cryptocurrency payments. Over the years, it has become a recognized company in the international iGaming sector, offering products such as casino platforms, crypto payment solutions, and blockchain-based services. The firm has also been linked to professional and personal networks connected to Israel, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus.

Playnance (www.playnance.com) appears to represent a blockchain-focused continuation of an earlier business approach associated with Pini Peter (Malhaz Pinhas Patarkazishvili), often described as one of the pioneers of the binary options industry.

For a long period, Peter’s Israel-based company SpotOption provided technology to numerous binary options brands. According to the U.S. SEC and the U.S. DOJ, many of these brands were involved in what has been described as one of the largest investment fraud schemes conducted online. Recent analysis by Scam-Or Project suggests that Playnance may serve as a blockchain-era successor to SpotOption, providing similar functionality adapted for cryptocurrency and Web3 systems.

Hypothesis: Georgian Connections

One unverified assumption is that Roland Isaev and Paata Gamgoneishvili, both known for their established ties to Israel, may have some form of association with Playnance under the direction of Pini Peter.

• Fact: Isaev, Gamgoneishvili, and Peter were all born in Georgia, a common background that often supports strong professional and political links.
• Fact: Both Isaev and Gamgoneishvili have prior involvement in sectors such as blockchain, gambling, and payment services—fields that align closely with Playnance’s focus.
• Hypothesis: Considering the historical intersections of networks in binary options and gaming, their potential role in Playnance requires closer review.

Why This Is Important

If confirmed, the participation of these individuals could suggest either a continuation or an adaptation of strategies from the binary options period, now applied to blockchain-based platforms. Considering SpotOption’s regulatory and legal history, such connections would be of interest for compliance monitoring, investor protection, and law enforcement oversight.

A Comprehensive Overview of CoinsPaid

CoinsPaid operates through a network of legal entities in Estonia, Lithuania, and El Salvador. Its primary operating entity, Dream Finance OÜ, holds a crypto license in Estonia and is controlled by Austrian entrepreneur Alexander Horst Riedinger, with Maksim Krupyshev serving as CEO. Another associated brand, CryptoProcessing, is also managed by the Estonian entity, further complicating the corporate structure.

Key Allegations Against CoinsPaid

1. Financial Misconduct and Bankruptcy:
   • The company publicly acknowledged a staggering $37 million loss due to a hack, which contradicts earlier reports of smaller figures. This discrepancy raises questions about the transparency of their financial reporting.
   • There are suggestions of impending bankruptcy despite ongoing operations, as internal financial assessments reveal significant negative equity, indicating potential insolvency.
2. Involvement in Money Laundering:
   • CoinsPaid is accused of laundering hundreds of millions of euros annually, with operations allegedly involving a network of Belarusian expatriates focused on offshore and illegal gambling platforms.
   • The company has been highlighted for non-compliance with local labor and tax regulations, further complicating its legal standing.
3. Dubious Management Practices:
   • Maksim Krupyshev, a Ukrainian crypto influencer and CEO of CoinsPaid, is accused of acting as a front for Belarusian operators, manipulating corporate structures to facilitate financial crimes without direct corporate implications.
4. Regulatory Evasion and Compliance Issues:
   • The company is said to exploit regulatory loopholes in Estonia and other jurisdictions, establishing front companies to obscure operations and avoid scrutiny from authorities.
5. Impact and Scope of Operations:
   • Whistleblower reports suggest that the risks posed by CoinsPaid to the financial system are akin to previous crises in the crypto sector, highlighting the need for stronger regulatory oversight.
   • Allegations of weak regulatory oversight in Estonia are concerning, especially given the renewal of Dream Finance’s license despite ongoing issues.

The Hidden Connection to AlphaPo

Shana Dovi’s investigation reveals significant connections between CoinsPaid and another crypto payment processor, AlphaPo. These links suggest operational and managerial overlaps, raising serious concerns about transparency and compliance.

Key Points of Connection:

• Shared Technology and Management:
  • Both companies utilize the same technology and share managerial staff, indicating a close operational relationship.
• Common Compliance Department:
  • A shared compliance department raises potential conflicts of interest and confidentiality breaches, further complicating their regulatory standing.
• Simultaneous Security Breaches:
  • Both entities experienced simultaneous hacks in July 2023, suggesting deep operational integration and potential vulnerabilities in their security measures.
• Financial Interdependence:
  • Funds and clients appear to move between CoinsPaid and AlphaPo without proper financial compensation, indicating internal management of financial flows that could mask illicit activities.
• Shared Personnel and Communication Channels:
  • Personnel discussions and client onboarding decisions are made jointly via shared Slack channels, blurring the lines between the two companies.
• Fronting Allegations:
  • While CoinsPaid presents itself as separate from AlphaPo in official narratives, internal communications reportedly acknowledge their unity, suggesting a deliberate effort to obfuscate true ownership and control.

Key Individuals Involved

The report highlights several individuals associated with CoinsPaid and AlphaPo, whose roles suggest involvement in the companies’ questionable operations:

| Hanna Drabysheuskaya | Payments handler at CoinsPaid. | | Aliaksei Kuzniatsou | Head of Treasury at CoinsPaid and AlphaPo. | | Maria Akulenko | Former Chief Legal Officer of CoinsPaid Group. |

Business Metrics and Entities

The operational landscape of CoinsPaid and its associated entities is complex, with various trading names, business activities, and legal structures. Here’s a detailed overview:

Conclusion: The Implications of the Investigation

The allegations against CoinsPaid and its connections to AlphaPo raise significant concerns about the integrity of their operations and the potential risks they pose to the broader financial ecosystem. The intertwining of management, shared technology, and financial interdependence between these entities suggests a deliberate effort to obscure true ownership and control, potentially facilitating unethical or illegal activities.

As regulatory bodies continue to scrutinize the crypto sector, the findings of Shana Dovi’s investigation may serve as a catalyst for more stringent oversight and enforcement actions. The implications of these allegations extend beyond the companies involved, highlighting the need for greater transparency and accountability in the rapidly evolving world of cryptocurrency and digital finance.

The ongoing developments in this case will be crucial to watch, as they may set precedents for how similar entities are regulated and held accountable in the future.

The Corporate Network and Its Legal Issues

1. Regulatory Oversight

The online casino sector is fraught with legal challenges. SoftSwiss, purportedly under the umbrella of Dama NV, has incurred substantial fines amounting to millions for failing to adhere to gambling regulations.

2. Corporate Affiliations and Investigations

Dama NV has strong ties to Direx NV, another significant player in the gambling industry, which faced scrutiny from the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) in 2019. The leadership of Direx NV, including Ivan Montik and Maksim Max Trafimovich, were identified as directors and owners, with legal counsel provided by REVERA, a firm closely associated with SoftSwiss executives.

3. Cryptocurrency Processing Controversies

Numerous individuals connected to these companies, primarily from Belarus, have been accused of facilitating cryptocurrency transactions aimed at the Russian market. These operations are alleged to assist in circumventing sanctions while concealing illicit financial activities.

Notable Legal Cases

Australian Investigations (2019)

• Entity: Direx NV
• Regulatory Body: ACMA
• Key Issues: Operating unlicensed interactive gambling services and failing to protect players.
• Legal Representation: REVERA, led by Helen Mourashko, who has connections to Pavel Kashuba, CFO of SoftSwiss.

Dutch Regulatory Actions (2021-2023)

• Impacted Entity: N1 Interactive Ltd., operator of the Betchan website.
• Outcome: Websites were rendered inaccessible in the Netherlands following regulatory enforcement.

Allegations Against Key Individuals

Connections to Criminal Activities

Ivan Montik and his associates, including Roland Yakovlevich Isaev and Paata Gamgoneishvili, have been linked to various illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, Forex scams, and unlicensed gambling. Despite claims of disassociation, financial transactions indicate ongoing connections to criminal networks.

Use of Corruption

There are reports suggesting that SoftSwiss and its affiliates have employed bribery to avoid regulatory scrutiny and lessen legal repercussions.

Unresolved Issues

Oversight of Financial Gains

The companies report a staggering €13 billion in profits, raising critical questions:

• Who oversees these financial operations?
• Are there undisclosed links between these profits and illegal activities?

Future Regulatory Measures

What actions will international authorities take to address the operations of SoftSwiss and its network? How can these companies persist in their activities despite accumulating fines and evidence of wrongdoing?

Conclusion

The intricate web involving SoftSwiss, CoinsPaid, and their affiliates underscores the complex relationship between online gambling, cryptocurrency processing, and organized crime. While jurisdictions like Australia and the Netherlands have imposed fines and initiated legal actions, the broader network continues to function, highlighting the urgent need for enhanced international regulatory oversight.