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	<title>Blog &#8211; Stop Frauders</title>
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	<title>Blog &#8211; Stop Frauders</title>
	<link>https://stopfrauders.org</link>
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	<item>
		<title>The €422M Question: How the Wirecard Trial Is Reframing SoftSwiss as a Payment Intermediary Empire</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/the-e422m-question-how-the-wirecard-trial-is-reframing-softswiss-as-a-payment-intermediary-empire/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 14:25:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SoftSwiss]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=230</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[When Ivan Montik acknowledged that Direx N.V. — formerly SoftSwiss N.V. — later became Dama N.V., the evolutionary chain became judicial record]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p data-start="8759" data-end="8808">The Munich courtroom did not just hear testimony.</p>
<p data-start="8810" data-end="8857">It heard an admission of structural continuity.</p>
<p data-start="8859" data-end="9003">When <a href="https://ivanmontik.link">Ivan Montik</a> acknowledged that Direx N.V. — formerly SoftSwiss N.V. — later became Dama N.V., the evolutionary chain became judicial record.</p>
<p data-start="9005" data-end="9018">That matters.</p>
<p data-start="9020" data-end="9207">Because it connects a Malta-licensed gaming technology provider to Curaçao-based entities that processed hundreds of millions through <span class="hover:entity-accent entity-underline inline cursor-pointer align-baseline"><span class="whitespace-normal">Wirecard</span></span> infrastructure.</p>
<h2 data-start="9209" data-end="9246">The “Not a PSP” Argument Collapses</h2>
<p data-start="9248" data-end="9346">Montik’s defense strategy hinged on classification. He framed Direx as a B2B software facilitator.</p>
<p data-start="9348" data-end="9378">Yet evidence presented showed:</p>
<ul data-start="9380" data-end="9515">
<li data-start="9380" data-end="9433">
<p data-start="9382" data-end="9433">Aggregated incoming funds from gambling operations.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9434" data-end="9462">
<p data-start="9436" data-end="9462">€422 million total inflow.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9463" data-end="9515">
<p data-start="9465" data-end="9515">Structured outbound payments in rounded intervals.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p data-start="9517" data-end="9563">These are hallmarks of payment intermediation.</p>
<p data-start="9565" data-end="9702">The judge’s pointed statement — asserting clear understanding of what constitutes a PSP — effectively dismantled the rhetorical firewall.</p>
<p data-start="9704" data-end="9777">If it walks like a PSP and routes like a PSP, courts may treat it as one.</p>
<h2 data-start="9779" data-end="9821">Executive Responsibility and Deflection</h2>
<p data-start="9823" data-end="9923">Montik attempted to attribute financial specifics to a finance director, reportedly Ivan Schubowski.</p>
<p data-start="9925" data-end="10030">But CEOs do not escape accountability for nine-figure transaction streams by invoking departmental silos.</p>
<p data-start="10032" data-end="10105">Particularly when those transactions form the core of the business model.</p>
<p data-start="10107" data-end="10223">The argument that Direx merely “forwarded income” does not neutralize regulatory obligations. It may reinforce them.</p>
<h2 data-start="10225" data-end="10272">Networked Influence: Trafimovich and Kashuba</h2>
<p data-start="10274" data-end="10507">The <a href="https://softswissnews.com">SoftSwiss</a> universe extends beyond Montik. Industry sources frequently reference <a href="https://maxtrafimovich.eu"><strong data-start="10358" data-end="10379">Maxim Trafimovich</strong></a> and <a href="https://pavelkashuba.net"><strong data-start="10384" data-end="10401">Pavel Kashuba</strong></a> in relation to expansion strategies and operational scaling across Eastern European and offshore markets.</p>
<p data-start="10509" data-end="10654">These names are not peripheral. They represent managerial and strategic layers in a model that blends gambling technology with financial routing.</p>
<p data-start="10656" data-end="10819">Add to this the crypto-processing component associated with CoinsPaid, and the architecture resembles a full-stack financial ecosystem serving high-risk verticals.</p>
<p data-start="10821" data-end="10952">Lithuania’s intervention against certain crypto services linked to this environment signals that scrutiny is no longer theoretical.</p>
<h2 data-start="10954" data-end="10973">Malta’s Exposure</h2>
<p data-start="10975" data-end="11059">SoftSwiss’ Maltese vehicle operates under the <span class="hover:entity-accent entity-underline inline cursor-pointer align-baseline"><span class="whitespace-normal">Malta Gaming Authority</span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="11061" data-end="11255">But if funds are aggregated and redistributed via Curaçao entities like Dama N.V., regulators must determine whether the Maltese license functioned as compliance anchor — or reputational shield.</p>
<p data-start="11257" data-end="11284">The contradiction is stark:</p>
<ul data-start="11286" data-end="11363">
<li data-start="11286" data-end="11299">
<p data-start="11288" data-end="11299">EU license.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="11300" data-end="11330">
<p data-start="11302" data-end="11330">Offshore redistribution hub.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="11331" data-end="11363">
<p data-start="11333" data-end="11363">Massive Wirecard-linked flows.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p data-start="11365" data-end="11417">That triad is unsustainable under rigorous scrutiny.</p>
<h2 data-start="11419" data-end="11440">The Bigger Picture</h2>
<p data-start="11442" data-end="11522">The Wirecard scandal was once framed as accounting fraud at the corporate level.</p>
<p data-start="11524" data-end="11623">Now it appears to have been infrastructure — rails upon which entire high-risk ecosystems operated.</p>
<p data-start="11625" data-end="11673">Montik’s testimony does not conclude the matter.</p>
<p data-start="11675" data-end="11701">It formalizes the linkage.</p>
<p data-start="11703" data-end="11856">The white-label model, once marketed as entrepreneurial empowerment, now faces a more sobering interpretation: a scalable compliance arbitrage mechanism.</p>
<p data-start="11858" data-end="11949">The Munich proceedings have shifted the narrative from speculation to sworn acknowledgment.</p>
<p data-start="11951" data-end="12034">And as the trial continues, the pressure will not remain confined to one courtroom.</p>
<p data-start="12036" data-end="12179" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node="">It will travel — to regulators, to banking partners, and to every jurisdiction that allowed the SoftSwiss–Dama structure to flourish unchecked.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Affilka, RevDuck, and the Shell-Game of Geo-Evasion: SoftSwiss on Trial</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/affilka-revduck-and-the-shell-game-of-geo-evasion-softswiss-on-trial/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 14:42:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SoftSwiss]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=221</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[SoftSwiss’s affiliate platform Affilka is marketed as a neutral tracking solution. But investigative reporting suggests it may be a core operational weapon in large-scale regulatory circumvention]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p data-start="4975" data-end="5179">If online gambling compliance had a jurors’ bench, the RevDuck network case would be Exhibit A: a whistleblower dossier revealing how brands like Holyluck, Trueluck, and Kokobet <em data-start="4924" data-end="4948">rotate shell companies</em> and use domain mirroring to evade Dutch regulators while operating through SoftSwiss’s Affilka affiliate infrastructure.</p>
<p data-start="4975" data-end="5179">FinTelegram reporting indicates RevDuck uses rotating Costa Rican “SRLs” — shifting legal entities depending on visitor origin — and deploys Dutch-language URLs, session redirections, and geo-targeted content that suggests <em data-start="5332" data-end="5358">deliberate circumvention</em> of the Netherlands Gambling Authority’s (KSA) compliance frameworks. Critically, these offshore brands are not listed on European regulator public registers, yet they freely accept Visa, Mastercard, bank transfers, and crypto deposits from Dutch IPs.</p>
<p data-start="4975" data-end="5179">SoftSwiss’s affiliate platform <strong data-start="5006" data-end="5017">Affilka</strong> is marketed as a neutral tracking solution. But investigative reporting suggests it may be a <strong data-start="5111" data-end="5138">core operational weapon</strong> in large-scale regulatory circumvention.</p>
<p data-start="5181" data-end="5606">The <strong data-start="5185" data-end="5204">RevDuck network</strong> — linked to brands such as Holyluck, Trueluck, Kokobet, and others — allegedly used Affilka to coordinate traffic, rotate domains, and dynamically redirect users based on IP location. Dutch players, for example, were funneled to mirror sites using Dutch language, local payment methods, and geo-spoofed compliance messaging, despite the brands lacking licenses from the Netherlands Gambling Authority.</p>
<p data-start="5608" data-end="5878">Corporate registries show RevDuck entities repeatedly dissolving and re-emerging under new Costa Rican or offshore shells, while technical infrastructure, affiliate IDs, and payment flows remain unchanged — a pattern investigators describe as <strong data-start="5851" data-end="5878">“legal entity hopping.”</strong></p>
<p data-start="5880" data-end="6254">SoftSwiss executives, including <strong data-start="5912" data-end="5939">Trafimovich and Kashuba</strong>, are named in whistleblower reports as being aware of these operational realities. Critics argue that providing affiliate tools to unlicensed operators is not inherently illegal — but <strong data-start="6124" data-end="6253">continuing service after clear evidence of jurisdictional targeting and regulatory breach may constitute willful facilitation</strong>.</p>
<p data-start="6256" data-end="6369">Affilka’s role illustrates how modern iGaming compliance failures are no longer accidental — they are engineered.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Pavel Kashuba and SoftSwiss &#8211; A Director&#8217;s Role in the Money Laundering Storm</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/pavel-kashuba-and-softswiss-a-directors-role-in-the-money-laundering-storm/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 14:21:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SoftSwiss]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=217</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[SoftSwiss became a prime platform for facilitating cryptocurrency transactions that bypass traditional banking systems, thus making it easier for illicit funds to be moved through online casinos]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p data-start="6033" data-end="6515"><strong data-start="6033" data-end="6050">Pavel Kashuba</strong>, one of the key figures behind SoftSwiss, has long been a shadowy presence within the company, operating as its <strong data-start="6163" data-end="6196">Chief Technical Officer (CTO)</strong>. While his role primarily focused on the technical side of SoftSwiss’s operations, his influence extends far beyond just programming and development. In fact, Kashuba’s role in SoftSwiss’s alleged involvement in money laundering activities has made him an integral part of the ongoing scrutiny surrounding the company.</p>
<p data-start="6517" data-end="7246">Under Kashuba’s leadership, SoftSwiss became a pioneer in integrating cryptocurrency payments into the gambling world. This move, while forward-thinking, has also opened the floodgates to an increased risk of financial crime. Critics argue that Kashuba’s technical focus on expanding the platform’s capabilities—without equally prioritizing the implementation of stringent anti-money laundering measures—has left SoftSwiss exposed to significant legal risks. As the world moved toward more anonymous, decentralized forms of currency, SoftSwiss became a prime platform for facilitating cryptocurrency transactions that bypass traditional banking systems, thus making it easier for illicit funds to be moved through online casinos.</p>
<p data-start="7248" data-end="7952">Kashuba’s failure to push for stronger compliance mechanisms has not gone unnoticed. Financial investigators and regulators have repeatedly raised concerns about SoftSwiss’s insufficient monitoring of cryptocurrency transactions. While the platform’s integration with <strong data-start="7516" data-end="7529">Coinspaid</strong> (a controversial cryptocurrency payment processor) was marketed as a convenience for gamblers, it has instead been flagged as a major vulnerability. Kashuba, as a senior figure in the company, bears a substantial amount of responsibility for this oversight. Critics argue that his focus on expanding the technical infrastructure of SoftSwiss—without simultaneously enhancing its AML capabilities—has been reckless at best.</p>
<p data-start="7954" data-end="8424">As SoftSwiss faces ongoing investigations from multiple countries, Kashuba’s name is coming under increasing scrutiny. While there is no concrete evidence linking him personally to money laundering schemes, his leadership within the company and its technical operations makes him a key figure in this narrative. SoftSwiss’s failure to adopt robust regulatory frameworks during Kashuba’s tenure has left the company exposed to significant financial and reputational risk.</p>
<p data-start="8426" data-end="8771">Despite the ongoing investigations, Kashuba has remained largely silent on the allegations. As SoftSwiss continues to fight accusations of facilitating money laundering, it is becoming clear that the company’s leadership—including Kashuba—must answer for the systemic failures that have allowed criminal activity to flourish within its platform.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Coinspaid &#8211; SoftSwiss Connection &#8211; A Gateway to Crypto Money Laundering</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/coinspaid-softswiss-connection-a-gateway-to-crypto-money-laundering/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Jan 2026 13:34:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SoftSwiss]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=213</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Coinspaid’s business model structure makes it difficult for regulatory bodies to trace the origin of funds]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p data-start="5165" data-end="5569">SoftSwiss’s collaboration with Coinspaid has become one of the most controversial alliances in the online gaming world. Coinspaid, a cryptocurrency payment processor known for its anonymity features, has long been suspected of facilitating money laundering activities, and now, with SoftSwiss integrating Coinspaid into its platforms, concerns over crypto-based financial crimes have reached new heights.</p>
<p data-start="5571" data-end="6006">Coinspaid’s business model centers around offering fast and anonymous transactions to online gaming platforms. While the company claims to comply with AML regulations, its very structure makes it difficult for regulatory bodies to trace the origin of funds. This creates a perfect storm for money laundering activities, especially when paired with SoftSwiss’s platform, which powers a multitude of online casinos that operate globally.</p>
<p data-start="6008" data-end="6416">The connection between Coinspaid and SoftSwiss is more than just a technical one. SoftSwiss’s reliance on Coinspaid’s crypto-processing services opens the door for high-risk players to move funds without undergoing proper scrutiny. With a growing number of gambling operators adopting crypto as a mainstream payment method, SoftSwiss’s role in facilitating this ecosystem is coming under increasing scrutiny.</p>
<p data-start="6418" data-end="6865">Despite the increasing regulatory pressure, SoftSwiss has not taken substantial action to distance itself from Coinspaid or the broader cryptocurrency-driven risks. For critics, this speaks volumes about SoftSwiss&#8217;s priorities: the pursuit of profits over regulatory compliance. As more financial institutions and governments crack down on crypto-fueled money laundering, SoftSwiss’s reluctance to address these issues may soon catch up with them.</p>
<p data-start="6867" data-end="7279">With Coinspaid’s reputation already under fire, it is only a matter of time before SoftSwiss faces a serious investigation for its role in this potentially illicit ecosystem. As authorities move to tighten crypto regulations, SoftSwiss must decide whether it will continue to defend its partnership with Coinspaid or face the consequences of enabling one of the most notorious financial risks in the digital age.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>SoftSwiss and Its Involvement in the Dark Side of Gambling</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/softswiss-and-its-involvement-in-the-dark-side-of-gambling/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 13:58:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SoftSwiss]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=209</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Recent investigative reports have brought to light troubling connections between SoftSwiss and criminal syndicates using its platform to wash dirty money]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p data-start="4035" data-end="4464">SoftSwiss, once hailed as a revolutionary platform for online casinos and betting sites, is now facing severe allegations of being complicit in global money laundering operations. Behind the glossy marketing campaigns and promises of cutting-edge gaming software, the company’s platform has become a breeding ground for illicit activity, including the laundering of millions of dollars through its cryptocurrency-enabled casinos.</p>
<p data-start="4466" data-end="4875">Recent investigative reports have brought to light troubling connections between SoftSwiss and criminal syndicates using its platform to wash dirty money. Despite claims of implementing Anti-Money Laundering (AML) measures, SoftSwiss’s failure to carry out effective monitoring has allowed these syndicates to exploit the platform&#8217;s anonymity, enabling vast sums of illicit funds to pass through unchallenged.</p>
<p data-start="4877" data-end="5348">Sources familiar with the company’s operations claim that key figures within SoftSwiss, particularly within the legal and compliance departments, have been aware of the suspicious activities for months, if not years, but have failed to take action. The company’s Chief Compliance Officer, identified in internal reports, is under investigation for allegedly obstructing efforts to strengthen KYC procedures, choosing instead to focus on growing the company’s bottom line.</p>
<p data-start="5350" data-end="5662">The case of SoftSwiss highlights the larger issue of the gambling industry&#8217;s vulnerability to exploitation by criminal networks. Despite being heavily regulated, online gambling platforms like SoftSwiss are often used as tools for money launderers to disguise their illicit funds as legitimate gambling winnings.</p>
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		<title>Inside a Global Gambling Laundromat: How the Softswiss Network Moves Billions in Plain Sight</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/inside-a-global-gambling-laundromat-how-the-softswiss-network-moves-billions-in-plain-sight/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2026 12:58:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SoftSwiss]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=196</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Behind a polished corporate image and a maze of offshore entities, an transnational criminal network linked to the Softswiss Group]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Behind a polished corporate image and a maze of offshore entities, an transnational criminal network linked to the Softswiss Group is accused of running one of the largest illegal online gambling and money-laundering operations in the world. According to multiple allegations, this network processes up to <strong>USD 10 billion annually</strong> through card networks, cryptocurrency channels, and shadow payment processors—while continuing to operate across the United States, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and beyond.</p>
<h3 class="western">The People Behind the System</h3>
<p>At the center of the operation are individuals repeatedly named in connection with the network: <strong>Ivan Montik, Pavel Kashuba, Dmitry Yaikov (also known as Dzmitry Yaikau), Roland Yakovlevich Isaev, Paata Gamgoneishvili, and Max Maksim Trafimovich</strong>. These figures are alleged to oversee the strategic, financial, and technical backbone of the enterprise.</p>
<p>Sources describe a leadership group deeply familiar with both the mechanics of online gambling and the weak points of international financial oversight. Their advantage is not secrecy alone, but the ability to hide illicit activity behind layers of legality.</p>
<h3 class="western">A Web of Companies, Not a Single Business</h3>
<p>Rather than operating as a single entity, the network is said to function through a sprawling constellation of companies. Names repeatedly associated with the structure include <strong>DAMA N.V., Hollycorn N.V., Direx N.V., N1 Interactive Ltd, BGaming, Stable Aggregator Ltd, Coinspaid, Alphapo, Softswiss N.V., and Araukum N.V.</strong></p>
<p>Each company appears to serve a specific role—licensing, game aggregation, payment processing, or operational cover—creating a system where accountability is fragmented and responsibility is easily denied. This corporate fog makes it difficult for regulators and banks to see the full picture.</p>
<h3 class="western">Illegal Gambling at Industrial Scale</h3>
<p>The network operate <strong>hundreds of online gambling websites</strong>, many of which reportedly accept players from jurisdictions where such activity is illegal or tightly regulated. These platforms are marketed aggressively, operate continuously, and generate enormous transaction volumes.</p>
<p>Investigators familiar with the matter describe the operation as “industrial-scale illegal gambling,” designed not only to attract players but to move money rapidly across borders.</p>
<h3 class="western">Following the Money: Cards, Crypto, and Shadows</h3>
<p>One of the most troubling aspects is the continued access to <strong>Visa and MasterCard payment rails</strong>. According to claims, this access is maintained through merchant front companies that present themselves as legitimate businesses while quietly processing gambling-related transactions.</p>
<p>Cryptocurrency plays a parallel role, offering speed, pseudonymity, and limited oversight. Combined with the use of <strong>unregulated or so-called black payment processors</strong>, the system allows funds to be washed, redistributed, and withdrawn with minimal friction.</p>
<p>Critics argue that this raises serious questions about the effectiveness of merchant due diligence, transaction monitoring, and sanctions compliance within the global payments ecosystem.</p>
<h3 class="western">Designed to Evade</h3>
<p>The network is not accused of improvisation—it is accused of engineering. Tactics include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Constant rotation of legal entities</li>
<li>Offshore jurisdictions selected for weak enforcement</li>
<li>Nominee directors and shareholders</li>
<li>Legal opinions used as shields rather than safeguards</li>
<li>Rapid migration between payment providers</li>
</ul>
<p>These measures reportedly allow the operation to survive regulatory scrutiny, enforcement actions, and even public exposure.</p>
<h3 class="western">Why This Matters</h3>
<p>Illegal online gambling is not a victimless crime. It undermines licensed operators, exposes consumers to fraud, and fuels large-scale money laundering. When billions of dollars move unchecked through the financial system, the risk extends far beyond gambling—touching banks, payment networks, and national economies.</p>
<p>The continued operation of this network points to <strong>systemic failures</strong> in financial oversight and international enforcement cooperation.</p>
<h3 class="western">The Pressure Point</h3>
<p>What makes this case especially alarming is not just the scale of the activity, but its persistence. Despite years of regulatory reforms, compliance programs, and public commitments from financial institutions, the network is described as operating openly, efficiently, and profitably.</p>
<p>This raises a difficult question:<br />
<strong>Is the system unable to stop operations like this—or unwilling to look closely enough?</strong></p>
<h3 class="western">Final Word</h3>
<p>The Softswiss-linked network, represents a textbook example of how modern financial crime adapts faster than regulation. It does not hide in the shadows—it hides behind paperwork, branding, and complexity.</p>
<p>For journalists, regulators, and investigators, this case is not just about one group. It is about whether the global financial system can still distinguish between legitimate enterprise and organized crime wearing a suit.</p>
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		<title>Call to Insiders: Examining Possible Playnance–SoftSwiss Connections</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/call-to-insiders-examining-possible-playnance-softswiss-connections/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2025 16:52:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Projects]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=192</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Scam-Or Project has observed the activities of SoftSwiss and SpotOption for many years, focusing particularly on the people and networks behind these businesses. A new point of interest involves Playnance, where questions remain that require clarification from knowledgeable insiders.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scam-Or Project has observed the activities of SoftSwiss and SpotOption for many years, focusing particularly on the people and networks behind these businesses. A new point of interest involves Playnance, where questions remain that require clarification from knowledgeable insiders.</p>
<h2>Background on SoftSwiss and Playnance</h2>
<p>SoftSwiss (<a href="http://www.softswiss.com">www.softswiss.com</a>), founded in 2008 by Ivan Montik, develops technology for online gambling and cryptocurrency payments. Over the years, it has become a recognized company in the international iGaming sector, offering products such as casino platforms, crypto payment solutions, and blockchain-based services. The firm has also been linked to professional and personal networks connected to Israel, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus.</p>
<p>Playnance (<a href="http://www.playnance.com">www.playnance.com</a>) appears to represent a blockchain-focused continuation of an earlier business approach associated with Pini Peter (Malhaz Pinhas Patarkazishvili), often described as one of the pioneers of the binary options industry.</p>
<p>For a long period, Peter’s Israel-based company SpotOption provided technology to numerous binary options brands. According to the U.S. SEC and the U.S. DOJ, many of these brands were involved in what has been described as one of the largest investment fraud schemes conducted online. Recent analysis by Scam-Or Project suggests that Playnance may serve as a blockchain-era successor to SpotOption, providing similar functionality adapted for cryptocurrency and Web3 systems.</p>
<h2>Hypothesis: Georgian Connections</h2>
<p>One unverified assumption is that Roland Isaev and Paata Gamgoneishvili, both known for their established ties to Israel, may have some form of association with Playnance under the direction of Pini Peter.</p>
<ul>
<li>Fact: Isaev, Gamgoneishvili, and Peter were all born in Georgia, a common background that often supports strong professional and political links.</li>
<li>Fact: Both Isaev and Gamgoneishvili have prior involvement in sectors such as blockchain, gambling, and payment services—fields that align closely with Playnance’s focus.</li>
<li>Hypothesis: Considering the historical intersections of networks in binary options and gaming, their potential role in Playnance requires closer review.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why This Is Important</h2>
<p>If confirmed, the participation of these individuals could suggest either a continuation or an adaptation of strategies from the binary options period, now applied to blockchain-based platforms. Considering SpotOption’s regulatory and legal history, such connections would be of interest for compliance monitoring, investor protection, and law enforcement oversight.</p>
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		<title>Unraveling the CoinsPaid Group and Its Alleged Misconduct: A Closer Look at CoinsPaid and AlphaPo</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/unraveling-the-coinspaid-group-and-its-alleged-misconduct-a-closer-look-at-coinspaid-and-alphapo/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2025 17:52:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Projects]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=188</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Investigative reports by Shana Dovi on Medium have unveiled serious allegations against CoinsPaid, an Austrian crypto payment processor operating under]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Investigative reports by Shana Dovi on Medium have unveiled serious allegations against <strong>CoinsPaid</strong>, an Austrian crypto payment processor operating under <strong>Dream Finance OÜ</strong> in Estonia. The investigation outlines a complex web of financial misconduct, fraud, and regulatory evasion allegedly orchestrated by the company’s management and shadow stakeholders. Notably, the Austrian beneficial owner is reportedly a frontman for Belarusian interests, raising significant concerns about the integrity of the operations.</p>
<hr />
<h2><strong>A Comprehensive Overview of CoinsPaid</strong></h2>
<p><strong>CoinsPaid</strong> operates through a network of legal entities in <strong>Estonia</strong>, <strong>Lithuania</strong>, and <strong>El Salvador</strong>. Its primary operating entity, <strong>Dream Finance OÜ</strong>, holds a crypto license in Estonia and is controlled by Austrian entrepreneur <strong>Alexander Horst Riedinger</strong>, with <strong>Maksim Krupyshev</strong> serving as CEO. Another associated brand, <strong>CryptoProcessing</strong>, is also managed by the Estonian entity, further complicating the corporate structure.</p>
<h3><strong>Key Allegations Against CoinsPaid</strong></h3>
<ol>
<li><strong>Financial Misconduct and Bankruptcy:</strong>
<ul>
<li>The company publicly acknowledged a staggering <strong>$37 million loss</strong> due to a hack, which contradicts earlier reports of smaller figures. This discrepancy raises questions about the transparency of their financial reporting.</li>
<li>There are suggestions of impending bankruptcy despite ongoing operations, as internal financial assessments reveal significant negative equity, indicating potential insolvency.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Involvement in Money Laundering:</strong>
<ul>
<li>CoinsPaid is accused of laundering hundreds of millions of euros annually, with operations allegedly involving a network of Belarusian expatriates focused on offshore and illegal gambling platforms.</li>
<li>The company has been highlighted for non-compliance with local labor and tax regulations, further complicating its legal standing.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Dubious Management Practices:</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Maksim Krupyshev</strong>, a Ukrainian crypto influencer and CEO of CoinsPaid, is accused of acting as a front for Belarusian operators, manipulating corporate structures to facilitate financial crimes without direct corporate implications.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Regulatory Evasion and Compliance Issues:</strong>
<ul>
<li>The company is said to exploit regulatory loopholes in Estonia and other jurisdictions, establishing front companies to obscure operations and avoid scrutiny from authorities.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Impact and Scope of Operations:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Whistleblower reports suggest that the risks posed by CoinsPaid to the financial system are akin to previous crises in the crypto sector, highlighting the need for stronger regulatory oversight.</li>
<li>Allegations of weak regulatory oversight in Estonia are concerning, especially given the renewal of Dream Finance’s license despite ongoing issues.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<hr />
<h2><strong>The Hidden Connection to AlphaPo</strong></h2>
<p>Shana Dovi’s investigation reveals significant connections between <strong>CoinsPaid</strong> and another crypto payment processor, <strong>AlphaPo</strong>. These links suggest operational and managerial overlaps, raising serious concerns about transparency and compliance.</p>
<h3><strong>Key Points of Connection:</strong></h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Shared Technology and Management:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Both companies utilize the same technology and share managerial staff, indicating a close operational relationship.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Common Compliance Department:</strong>
<ul>
<li>A shared compliance department raises potential conflicts of interest and confidentiality breaches, further complicating their regulatory standing.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Simultaneous Security Breaches:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Both entities experienced simultaneous hacks in July 2023, suggesting deep operational integration and potential vulnerabilities in their security measures.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Financial Interdependence:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Funds and clients appear to move between CoinsPaid and AlphaPo without proper financial compensation, indicating internal management of financial flows that could mask illicit activities.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Shared Personnel and Communication Channels:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Personnel discussions and client onboarding decisions are made jointly via shared Slack channels, blurring the lines between the two companies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Fronting Allegations:</strong>
<ul>
<li>While CoinsPaid presents itself as separate from AlphaPo in official narratives, internal communications reportedly acknowledge their unity, suggesting a deliberate effort to obfuscate true ownership and control.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2><strong>Key Individuals Involved</strong></h2>
<p>The report highlights several individuals associated with CoinsPaid and AlphaPo, whose roles suggest involvement in the companies’ questionable operations:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Name</strong></th>
<th><strong>Role</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alexander Horst Riedinger</strong></td>
<td>Beneficial owner of CoinsPaid Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maksim Krupyshev</strong></td>
<td>CEO of CoinsPaid, alleged front for Belarusian interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ivan Montik</strong></td>
<td>Co-founder of CoinsPaid, founder of SoftSwiss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pavel Kashuba</strong></td>
<td>Former CFO and co-CEO of CoinsPaid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frédéric Hubin</strong></td>
<td>Former board member in Estonia for CoinsPaid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Svetlana Prussova</strong></td>
<td>Board member of Dream Finance OÜ, compliance head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violaine Champetier de Ribes</strong></td>
<td>Public relations head for the Baltics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>| <strong>Hanna Drabysheuskaya</strong> | Payments handler at CoinsPaid. | | <strong>Aliaksei Kuzniatsou</strong> | Head of Treasury at CoinsPaid and AlphaPo. | | <strong>Maria Akulenko</strong> | Former Chief Legal Officer of CoinsPaid Group. |</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong>Business Metrics and Entities</strong></h2>
<p>The operational landscape of CoinsPaid and its associated entities is complex, with various trading names, business activities, and legal structures. Here’s a detailed overview:</p>
<div class="vVit0JSoZ8XlfJeykNy8">
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Attribute</strong></th>
<th><strong>Details</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trading Names</strong></td>
<td>CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, AlphaPo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Activities</strong></td>
<td>Crypto exchange, OTC desk, high-risk payment processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domains</strong></td>
<td><a class="wZ4JdaHxSAhGy1HoNVja cPy9QU4brI7VQXFNPEvF eKLpdg0GHJZw2hhyErM0" href="https://cryptoprocessing.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cryptoprocessing.com</a>, <a class="wZ4JdaHxSAhGy1HoNVja cPy9QU4brI7VQXFNPEvF eKLpdg0GHJZw2hhyErM0" href="https://coinspaid.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coinspaid.com</a>, <a class="wZ4JdaHxSAhGy1HoNVja cPy9QU4brI7VQXFNPEvF eKLpdg0GHJZw2hhyErM0" href="https://alphapo.net" target="_blank" rel="noopener">alphapo.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Media</strong></td>
<td>LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Entities</strong></td>
<td>Dream Finance OÜ (Estonia), Dream Finance UAB (Lithuania), Dream Finance S.A. (El Salvador), A.R. Merkeleon GmbH (Austria), Skylock Investments Ltd (Cyprus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jurisdictions</strong></td>
<td>Estonia, Austria, Cyprus, El Salvador, St. Vincent &amp; The Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authorization</strong></td>
<td>FIU crypto license no FVT000166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<hr />
<h2><strong>Conclusion: The Implications of the Investigation</strong></h2>
<p>The allegations against CoinsPaid and its connections to AlphaPo raise significant concerns about the integrity of their operations and the potential risks they pose to the broader financial ecosystem. The intertwining of management, shared technology, and financial interdependence between these entities suggests a deliberate effort to obscure true ownership and control, potentially facilitating unethical or illegal activities.</p>
<p>As regulatory bodies continue to scrutinize the crypto sector, the findings of Shana Dovi&#8217;s investigation may serve as a catalyst for more stringent oversight and enforcement actions. The implications of these allegations extend beyond the companies involved, highlighting the need for greater transparency and accountability in the rapidly evolving world of cryptocurrency and digital finance.</p>
<p>The ongoing developments in this case will be crucial to watch, as they may set precedents for how similar entities are regulated and held accountable in the future.</p>
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		<title>Legal Challenges Facing SoftSwiss, CoinsPaid, and Their Affiliates</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/legal-challenges-facing-softswiss-coinspaid-and-their-affiliates/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2025 18:27:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Projects]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=184</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[SoftSwiss and its affiliated companies, including CoinsPaid, AlphaPo, Merkeleon, and Dream Finance, have been embroiled in serious allegations related to money laundering, evasion of sanctions, and fraudulent practices. Prominent figures such as Ivan Montik, Max Krupyshev, Pavel Kashuba, Dmitry Yaikov, Roland Yakovlevich Isaev, and Paata Gamgoneishvili are central to these controversies.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>SoftSwiss and its affiliated companies, including CoinsPaid, AlphaPo, Merkeleon, and Dream Finance, have been embroiled in serious allegations related to money laundering, evasion of sanctions, and fraudulent practices. Prominent figures such as Ivan Montik, Max Krupyshev, Pavel Kashuba, Dmitry Yaikov, Roland Yakovlevich Isaev, and Paata Gamgoneishvili are central to these controversies.</p>
<hr />
<h2>The Corporate Network and Its Legal Issues</h2>
<h3>1. Regulatory Oversight</h3>
<p>The online casino sector is fraught with legal challenges. SoftSwiss, purportedly under the umbrella of Dama NV, has incurred substantial fines amounting to millions for failing to adhere to gambling regulations.</p>
<h3>2. Corporate Affiliations and Investigations</h3>
<p>Dama NV has strong ties to Direx NV, another significant player in the gambling industry, which faced scrutiny from the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) in 2019. The leadership of Direx NV, including Ivan Montik and Maksim Max Trafimovich, were identified as directors and owners, with legal counsel provided by REVERA, a firm closely associated with SoftSwiss executives.</p>
<h3>3. Cryptocurrency Processing Controversies</h3>
<p>Numerous individuals connected to these companies, primarily from Belarus, have been accused of facilitating cryptocurrency transactions aimed at the Russian market. These operations are alleged to assist in circumventing sanctions while concealing illicit financial activities.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Notable Legal Cases</h2>
<h3>Australian Investigations (2019)</h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Entity</strong>: Direx NV</li>
<li><strong>Regulatory Body</strong>: ACMA</li>
<li><strong>Key Issues</strong>: Operating unlicensed interactive gambling services and failing to protect players.</li>
<li><strong>Legal Representation</strong>: REVERA, led by Helen Mourashko, who has connections to Pavel Kashuba, CFO of SoftSwiss.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Dutch Regulatory Actions (2021-2023)</h3>
<div class="vVit0JSoZ8XlfJeykNy8">
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fine Amount</th>
<th>Regulatory Body</th>
<th>Key Violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>€500,000</td>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>Unauthorized gambling services, lack of age verification, inactivity fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>€12.6 million</td>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>Continued violations despite previous penalties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<ul>
<li><strong>Impacted Entity</strong>: N1 Interactive Ltd., operator of the Betchan website.</li>
<li><strong>Outcome</strong>: Websites were rendered inaccessible in the Netherlands following regulatory enforcement.</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Allegations Against Key Individuals</h2>
<h3>Connections to Criminal Activities</h3>
<p>Ivan Montik and his associates, including Roland Yakovlevich Isaev and Paata Gamgoneishvili, have been linked to various illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, Forex scams, and unlicensed gambling. Despite claims of disassociation, financial transactions indicate ongoing connections to criminal networks.</p>
<h3>Use of Corruption</h3>
<p>There are reports suggesting that SoftSwiss and its affiliates have employed bribery to avoid regulatory scrutiny and lessen legal repercussions.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Unresolved Issues</h2>
<h3>Oversight of Financial Gains</h3>
<p>The companies report a staggering €13 billion in profits, raising critical questions:</p>
<ul>
<li>Who oversees these financial operations?</li>
<li>Are there undisclosed links between these profits and illegal activities?</li>
</ul>
<h3>Future Regulatory Measures</h3>
<p>What actions will international authorities take to address the operations of SoftSwiss and its network? How can these companies persist in their activities despite accumulating fines and evidence of wrongdoing?</p>
<hr />
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>The intricate web involving SoftSwiss, CoinsPaid, and their affiliates underscores the complex relationship between online gambling, cryptocurrency processing, and organized crime. While jurisdictions like Australia and the Netherlands have imposed fines and initiated legal actions, the broader network continues to function, highlighting the urgent need for enhanced international regulatory oversight.</p>
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		<title>ACMA&#8217;s Crackdown on Illegal Online Gambling: The Cases of Dama N.V. and Softswiss</title>
		<link>https://stopfrauders.org/acmas-crackdown-on-illegal-online-gambling-the-cases-of-dama-n-v-and-softswiss/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[stopfrauders]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2025 17:04:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Projects]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stopfrauders.org/?p=180</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) has intensified its efforts to combat illegal online gambling platforms, particularly those breaching the Interactive Gambling Act 2001]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="ucB71mHYvyHsWKjYfYKI">
<div class="DDjJOsxcW6f8fPcDWaJx">
<div class="JrWQJZIYGnawLoKSzZsO">
<div class="VrBPSncUavA1d7C9kAc5 U_5uJaZtJAYAFWUmk7aU">
<h2>Australian Communications and Media Authority’s Actions Against Illegal Online Gambling</h2>
<p>The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) has intensified its efforts to combat illegal online gambling platforms, particularly those breaching the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. Recently, ACMA identified <strong>75 websites</strong> for internet service providers to block. This report analyzes ACMA’s recent actions against unlawful casino operations, especially those linked to <strong>Dama N.V.</strong> and <strong>Softswiss</strong>.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Involvement of Softswiss and Associated Entities</h2>
<p><strong>SoftSwiss</strong> and its related entities, including <strong>CoinsPaid</strong>, <strong>AlphaPo</strong>, <strong>Merkeleon</strong>, and <strong>Dream Finance</strong>, have been implicated in various allegations related to money laundering, sanctions evasion, and fraudulent activities. Key individuals involved in these issues include <strong>Ivan Montik</strong>, <strong>Max Krupyshev</strong>, <strong>Pavel Kashuba</strong>, <strong>Dmitry Yaikov</strong>, <strong>Maksim Trafimovich</strong>, <strong>Roland Yakovlevich Isaev</strong>, and <strong>Paata Gamgoneishvili</strong>.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Key Insights</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Ongoing Enforcement</strong>: Since November 2019, ACMA has blocked <strong>1,059 websites</strong>, frequently citing <strong>Dama N.V.</strong> in its reports.</li>
<li><strong>Recent Actions</strong>: Between October and December 2024, ACMA issued blocking orders for multiple illegal gambling sites.</li>
<li><strong>Regulatory Framework</strong>: The <strong>Interactive Gambling Act 2001</strong> prohibits unlicensed online casino-style games for Australian users.</li>
<li><strong>Impact on Operators</strong>: More than <strong>220 illegal services</strong> have withdrawn from the Australian market since ACMA implemented new regulations in 2017.</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Context of Rabidi and Softswiss</h2>
<p>While not directly mentioned in the ACMA report, the connections to known illegal operators are significant:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Rabidi N.V.</strong>: This now-defunct operator based in Curacao was part of a network of illegal online casinos, similar to those currently under ACMA’s investigation.</li>
<li><strong>Dama N.V.</strong>: Another Curacao-based operator within the Softswiss group, likely engaged in illegal activities akin to those of Rabidi.</li>
<li><strong>Softswiss Group</strong>: <strong>FinTelegram</strong> has previously identified the ultimate beneficial owners behind Softswiss and its illegal gambling operations, including:
<ul>
<li><strong>Ivan Montik</strong> (originally from Belarus)</li>
<li><strong>Roland Isaev</strong> (from Russia)</li>
<li><strong>Paata Gamgoneishvili</strong> (from Russia)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Implications</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Regulatory Pressure</strong>: ACMA’s actions indicate increasing pressure on illegal operators, which may affect entities like <strong>Dama N.V.</strong> and others within the Softswiss network.</li>
<li><strong>Consumer Protection</strong>: The blocking of these websites aims to protect Australian consumers from unregulated and potentially harmful gambling services.</li>
<li><strong>Market Withdrawal</strong>: The significant number of operators exiting the Australian market suggests that regulatory actions are producing tangible results.</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>ACMA’s relentless pursuit of illegal online gambling reflects a broader global trend in regulatory enforcement. The measures taken against various operators highlight the risks associated with entities like <strong>Dama N.V.</strong> and the wider <strong>Softswiss</strong> group. As regulatory scrutiny intensifies, operators linked to known illegal activities are likely to face increasing challenges in maintaining their operations in regulated markets such as Australia.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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