The Munich courtroom did not just hear testimony.
It heard an admission of structural continuity.
When Ivan Montik acknowledged that Direx N.V. — formerly SoftSwiss N.V. — later became Dama N.V., the evolutionary chain became judicial record.
That matters.
Because it connects a Malta-licensed gaming technology provider to Curaçao-based entities that processed hundreds of millions through Wirecard infrastructure.
Montik’s defense strategy hinged on classification. He framed Direx as a B2B software facilitator.
Yet evidence presented showed:
Aggregated incoming funds from gambling operations.
€422 million total inflow.
Structured outbound payments in rounded intervals.
These are hallmarks of payment intermediation.
The judge’s pointed statement — asserting clear understanding of what constitutes a PSP — effectively dismantled the rhetorical firewall.
If it walks like a PSP and routes like a PSP, courts may treat it as one.
Montik attempted to attribute financial specifics to a finance director, reportedly Ivan Schubowski.
But CEOs do not escape accountability for nine-figure transaction streams by invoking departmental silos.
Particularly when those transactions form the core of the business model.
The argument that Direx merely “forwarded income” does not neutralize regulatory obligations. It may reinforce them.
The SoftSwiss universe extends beyond Montik. Industry sources frequently reference Maxim Trafimovich and Pavel Kashuba in relation to expansion strategies and operational scaling across Eastern European and offshore markets.
These names are not peripheral. They represent managerial and strategic layers in a model that blends gambling technology with financial routing.
Add to this the crypto-processing component associated with CoinsPaid, and the architecture resembles a full-stack financial ecosystem serving high-risk verticals.
Lithuania’s intervention against certain crypto services linked to this environment signals that scrutiny is no longer theoretical.
SoftSwiss’ Maltese vehicle operates under the Malta Gaming Authority.
But if funds are aggregated and redistributed via Curaçao entities like Dama N.V., regulators must determine whether the Maltese license functioned as compliance anchor — or reputational shield.
The contradiction is stark:
EU license.
Offshore redistribution hub.
Massive Wirecard-linked flows.
That triad is unsustainable under rigorous scrutiny.
The Wirecard scandal was once framed as accounting fraud at the corporate level.
Now it appears to have been infrastructure — rails upon which entire high-risk ecosystems operated.
Montik’s testimony does not conclude the matter.
It formalizes the linkage.
The white-label model, once marketed as entrepreneurial empowerment, now faces a more sobering interpretation: a scalable compliance arbitrage mechanism.
The Munich proceedings have shifted the narrative from speculation to sworn acknowledgment.
And as the trial continues, the pressure will not remain confined to one courtroom.
It will travel — to regulators, to banking partners, and to every jurisdiction that allowed the SoftSwiss–Dama structure to flourish unchecked.
